MS 97 International Business Previous Year Paper
MBA - Master of Business Administration
Note: Attempt any three questions from Section A. Section B is compulsory and carries 40 marks.
1. What is meant by "globalisation of business" What implications it has for problems if any, created by glabalisation of business?
2. Explain the theory of "Comparative cost advantage" How do firms in two different countries benefit from international trade in terms of this theory? Explain with examples.
3. What kind of strategy issues might arise in international between multinational parent company and subsidiaries? What development path's a subsidiary could adopt vis-à-vis if parent company?
4. What are the issues that need to be considered decision. What are the risks investment decision. What are the risks associated with these decisions and how can a company minimize these?
5. MNCs are supposed to build considerable market power. How does it influence that host country? Elaborate your answer with examples.
SECTION B
WESTINGHOUSE
In 1969, Westinghouse's top management noted with concern that its chief rival, General Electric, gained 25 percent of its sales abroad compared to only & percent by Westinghouse. Top management was determined to compete more vigorously against GE in foreign markets. At that time, Westinghouse had a separate operation, Westinghouse Electric International Company, which was located in New York, away from corporate headquarters in Pittsburgh Between 1969 and 1971, overseas volume increased to 15 percent of sales; and the chairman, Donald C. Burnham, said, "I've set a goal that 30 percent of our business will be outside the U.S. I hope to get there and then set a bigger goal." The spurt in foreign sales was largely the result of the aggressive pursuit of overseas acquisitions. This marked a substantial change in foreign operating practice, an as much as Westinghouse had depended almost entirely on exports and licensing agreements for its foreign sales since World War I, when its three European subsidiaries were confiscated.
From 1969 to 1971, the International Company operated alongside four other Westinghouse divisions. These were operated as companies that were each in charge of a group of diverse products. A major complaint of the International Company was that the four other companies tended to view foreign operations as marely an appendage to which they were unwilling to give sufficient technical or even product assistance. Since the International Company had to depend on the product groups for anything that it was going to export, there were problems of gaining continued assured supplies. The product companies were quite willing to divert output abroad when they had surplus production but were reluctant when there were shortages. This was largely because the International Company rather than the Product Company got credit for the sales and profits. Likewise, the products groups were reluctant to lend their best personnel to the International Company to assist in exportation of highly technical orders or to lend support to production from foreign licensing and subsidiaries.
As a partial result of these complaints, Westinghouse eliminated the international division of 1971, The four product0based companies were than put in charge of worldwide control of production and sale of their goods. (Westinghouse produces more than 8000 different products). The philosophy was that the people in those divisions would have a greater capability of selling (because of their access to product technology) than the disbanded company. Second, since they would now be evaluated on their foreign successes, they would be willing to divert resources to international development. Another factor that affected the decision to move to a worldwide product organization from that of an international division was that GE had made a similar move with apparent success a few years earlier.
At the time that responsibilities were shifted to the domestic division many of the managers from the formerly New York - based International Company did not conceal their belief that "those unsophisticated hicks back in Steeltown couldn't be trusted to fins U.S. consulates abroad let alone customers." Although management in each of the four product companies was free to pursue foreign business or not, each chose to do so. Between 1971 and 1976, foreign sales grew to 31 percent of the Westinghouse total. During this five-year period, product diversity continued to grow. The product emphasis was further accentuated in 1976, when the company was recognized into thirty-seven operating groups known as great deal of autonomy, including a free hand abroad.
From 1976 through 1978, foreign sales of Westinghouse fell to 24 percent of its total. The extension of responsibility by product units further complicated cooperation among units and created problems of duplication in foreign markets, Many horror stories surfaced, For instance, a company salesperson called on a Saudi businessman who pulled out business cards from sales people. Who had visited him from twenty-four other business units.
His question was "Who speaks for Westinghouse?" In another situation different units had established subsidiaries in the same country. One had excess cash while another was borrowing locally at an exorbitant rate. In many cases, large projects would require the ultimate cooperation among business units to carry out different parts. Art times, units could not agree in time to put together a package and lost out of foreign competition such as Brown Boveri from Switzerland and Hitachi from Japan. In a case in Brazil, three different sales groups were calling on the same customer for the same job.
By 1978 the vice-chairman and chief operating officer of Westinghouse was Douglas Danforth. He was highly interested in international expansion not only because he expected greater he had previously worked in the Mexican and Canadian subsidiaries. In early 1979 he enlisted a Westinghouse executive to head an exhaustive study of the firm's international operations and to make a recommendation within ninety days. The study group interviewed Westinghouse personnel in the United States and abroad. It also determined how other firms were handling their international operations. The recommendations wad to move to a matrix system with a head of international operations. The international operations were then to be organized along geographic lines including three regions. This was adopted. To get a consensus among the people in charge of product and geographic areas was a major departure from Westinghouse's product orientation. Danforth told the company's top 220 managers that "some of you will adjust and survive and some of you won't.
Dabforth announced that he wanted 35 percent of Westinghouse's sales to be coming from abroad by 1984. Seventeen countries were identified as having the highest potential, and these were examined in detail. To carry out the planned growth, it has been necessary to much country unit plans with product unit plans. In other words, if a product unit wants switch gear in Brazil increased by 40 percent and the Brazilian country manager wants to inquiries it by 50 percent they must either work out an agreement or refer the decision upward in the organisation to the next higher product and geographic heads. Disagreement can effectively go as high as the top-level operating committee, which consists of the chairman, vice-chairman, three presidents of product groups, the top financial officer and the president of the international group. The 1980 annual report showed export sales of $ 1.2 billion and sales from foreign production of $1.1 billion. The combination comprised 27 percent of Westinghouse's total.
Questions:
(i) What have been the organizational problems
inhibiting the international growth of Westinghouse?
(ii) What organizational characteristics may affect the successful
implementation of the matrix management at Westinghouse?
(iii) How can a firm such as Westinghouse go about implementing
a goal to increase the percentage of its sales accounted for
by foreign operations
